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HOW THE CONTENTIOUS NATURE OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AFFECTS "DIVERSITY" ON
THE BENCH
Theresa M. Beiner *
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this Symposium has been on the contentious na-
ture of the federal judicial appointments process and ways that
this problem might be solved. My concern is with one aspect of
this contentiousness: the difficulties of appointing a diverse
bench. In this context, I mean diversity on many levels, including
race, gender, socioeconomic status, as well as other background
factors such as career track and-I dare to say it-judicial ideol-
ogy, which I will more fully explain below.
I would like to start with an anecdote from an episode of the
television show The West Wing. In an episode that aired last
spring, the Bartlet Administration faced a vacancy on the Su-
preme Court of the United States, and thus had to determine the
best way to replace one of the Court's most conservative Associate
Justices, who unexpectedly passed away.1 Glenn Close portrayed
federal appellate judge Evelyn Baker Lang, a potential nominee
for this seat on the Supreme Court. The only problem with her
candidacy was that she was too ideologically to the left. She had
overturned a parental abortion consent law and was thought to
be judicially "active." Instead, the Administration was leaning
toward moderate appellate judge E. Bradford Shelton, played
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of
Law. B.A., 1986, University of Virginia; J.D., 1989, Northwestern University School of
Law. My thanks go to Professor Carl Tobias for inviting me to participate in this Sympo-
sium as well as to the University of Richmond Law Review members, who were gracious
hosts during this conference.
1. West Wing: The Supremes (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 24, 2004). Episode
summary available at http://www.nbc.com/The WestWing/episodeguide/109.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2005).
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well by Robert Picado, a judge who did not position himself on
any issue and characterized his approach to decision-making as
an allegiance to the eccentricity of the particular case. He was a
classic centrist.
Josh Lyman, one of President Bartlet's aides, favored Judge
Lang's appointment and devised a plan to appoint her as Chief
Justice in exchange for a nominee for Associate Justice sanc-
tioned by conservative Republicans. The Republicans chose appel-
late judge Christopher Mulriti, played by actor William Fichtner,
whose views the Bartlet Administration characterized as includ-
ing the refusal to recognize the right to privacy and the separa-
tion of church and state. Thus, his positions were thought so con-
servative that members of the Bartlet Administration considered
him an untenable nominee. Sounds like a familiar stalemate,
does it not?
On television, unlike in Washington, D.C., this story has a
happy ending. The pivotal moment came when members of Presi-
dent Bartlet's staff watched while these two potential nominees
sparred over Commerce Clause interpretation, specifically United
States v. Lopez.2 It was a great television moment-two appar-
ently agile legal minds discussing constitutional interpretation.
The end result, in the land of fiction, was that both judges were
appointed because President Bartlet and his aides became con-
vinced that differences of opinion among members of the Supreme
Court were more important than trying to please everyone with a
milquetoast appointee.
In real life, it may be possible to appoint conservative judges
such as Judge Mulriti (although perhaps not to the Supreme
Court), but I do not think it is currently possible to appoint a
Judge Lang, the judge portrayed by Glenn Close, even with a
Democratic president in office. Nor do I see the President and the
Senate trying to reach the type of compromise (you get one ap-
pointment; we get one appointment) that was reached between
the Bartlet Administration and conservative Republican mem-
bers of the Senate. And, I think that this is cause for concern.
With this backdrop in mind, I'd like to address three things in
this Article. First, I will address some of the hurdles nontradi-
tional judges face during the confirmation process and how that
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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might affect judicial appointments in the future. Second, I will
discuss studies by political scientists that explore the effects of
diversity on case outcomes in the federal courts. Finally, I will
look at recent appointees of both President Bill Clinton and Presi-
dent George W. Bush and suggest that there is more to diversity
than simply race and gender. Our bench is becoming homogene-
ous in other ways that we should not ignore and might well be
cause for concern.
II. HURDLES THAT NONTRADITIONAL JUDGES FACE IN THE
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
There are some who place the beginning of the recent politici-
zation of the judicial appointments process in the Carter Admini-
stration.3 President Carter specifically sought to appoint qualified
women and minority group members as well as those who
"[plossess[ed] and ha[d] demonstrated a commitment to equal jus-
tice under the law."4 At the beginning of the Carter Administra-
tion, woefully few women and members of minority groups had
served on the federal bench.5 The appointment of these so-called
"nontraditional judges" by the Carter Administration was, in and
of itself, controversial.6 So it should come as no great surprise
that President Clinton, who appointed record numbers of women
and minority group members,7 would have a tough time seeing
his nontraditional appointees through to confirmation.' Nontradi-
3. See Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86
JUDICATURE 13, 14 (2002). See generally Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increas-
ing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. ScI. Q. 259, 261-62 (2002)
(describing changes President Carter made to the appointment process in an effort to re-
move patronage from the process and instead select judges based on merit as well as to
diversify the bench).
4. Slotnick, supra note 3, at 15.
5. Id. ("When Jimmy Carter took office, six women had been appointed to lifetime
federal judgeships in our nation's history-Carter appointed 40 in four years. Similarly,
while 33 ethnic minorities-blacks, Hispanics, and Asians-had been appointed prior to
the Carter administration in the nation's history, 55 were seated during Jimmy Carter's
four-year tenure.").
6. See id.
7. See Rorie L. Spill & Kathleen A. Bratton, Clinton and Diversification of the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 84 JUDICATURE 256, 258, 261 (2001) (noting that President Clinton ap-
pointed 108 women, 61 African-Americans, 25 Latinos, 5 Asian-Americans, and 1 Native
American to the federal bench).
8. See generally Roger E. Hartley, Senate Delay of Minority Judicial Nominees: A
Look at Race, Gender, and Experience, 84 JUDICATURE 191, 193-96 (2001) (explaining the
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tional judges can face hurdles in the appointments process that
their white male counterparts do not.9 An examination of what
happened in judicial selection during the Clinton Administration
provides insight into the difficulties faced by both the nominee
and any president who is bold enough to nominate a nontradi-
tional judge to the federal bench.
President Clinton appointed record numbers of nontraditional
judges, 10 but these judges did not have an easy time during the
appointments process. The Clinton Administration's nontradi-
tional appointments to the district courts took on average six
weeks longer to go from nomination to a hearing than did white
male appointees. 1 The time period from nomination to confirma-
tion was on average forty-six days longer than for white male ap-
pointees.12 For the courts of appeals, it was even longer. It took
nearly two months longer from nomination to hearing for nontra-
ditional appointees as opposed to their white male counterparts
and 146 days longer (about five months) from nomination to con-
firmation. 3 This does not even encompass some of President Clin-
ton's highly qualified nominees who never made it to a vote. For
example, Elena Kagan did not receive a hearing before the Re-
lengthened confirmation time for President Clinton's nontraditional appointees).
9. See id. at 196 (noting that there is "strong statistical evidence" that racial minori-
ties and women were confirmed more slowly during the period of 1969 to 1998). But see
Wendy L. Martinek et al., To Advise and Consent: The Senate and Lower Federal Court
Nominations, 1977-1998, 64 J. POL. 337, 355 (2002) (finding in nominations from 1977 to
1998 that race and gender had "no effect on confirmation duration except in the case of
minority nominations to the district courts," which were estimated to take ten days
longer).
10. Spill & Bratton, supra note 7, at 258, 261.
11. Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228, 234 (2001).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 235. Much of this delay appears to have been caused by the 106th Congress.
In an article examining confirmations from 1969 to 1998, Roger Hartley found that Clin-
ton's female nominees, during divided government, were confirmed in an average of
twenty-six days longer than males. See Hartley, supra note 8, at 195. However, he did find
that Clinton's white nominees confirmed up to the time of his study were actually delayed
on average five days longer than African-American nominees. See id. at 194. Latino and
Asian-American nominees, however, averaged forty-three and 111 days longer, respec-
tively, than white appointees. See id. Another factor that may have affected the difference
in Hartley's and Goldman's results is that Hartley eliminated major recesses from his
count. See id. It is unclear whether Goldman considered recesses in arriving at his figures.
Hartley's study also appears to concern the time period from when a nomination is pre-
sented to the Senate and when that nominee is confirmed-not delays before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Id. at 192.
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publican-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee.14 Yet, she was
subsequently found sufficiently qualified to be the dean of Har-
vard Law School.' 5
Interestingly, the differences in length of time to confirmation
between men and women begins during the George H.W. Bush
Administration when there was divided government. 6 During
those years, women nominees were confirmed more slowly by the
Democratic-majority Senate than male nominees-seventy-six
days versus fifty-nine days. 7 Thus, creating delays for female ap-
pointees does not seem limited to Republican-majority Senates
with a Democratic president in office. Indeed, both Republicans
and Democrats appear to engage in extended scrutiny of female
appointees.
There are those who would argue that the delay for President
Clinton's nontraditional judicial nominees was a result of their
particularly left-leaning views.'" Because most of President Clin-
ton's nominees faced confirmation during divided government,
one might not expect the Republican-majority Senate to be in
lock-step with a Democratic president when it came to judicial
appointments.' 9 These nontraditional appointees, in theory, were
more likely to hold views with which Republican senators dis-
agreed.2 ° Hence, the longer appointment process was necessary to
fully vet these appointees so that senators would know their
views before being called to vote on them.2' This seems an
unlikely explanation, given the judicial records thus far of Presi-
dent Clinton's appointees.22
14. David G. Savage, Approval of 168 Bush Judges A Record, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6,
2003, at A6.
15. Id.
16. Hartley, supra note 8, at 194.
17. Id.
18. See Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 236-37; see also Edith H. Jones, Observa-
tions on the Status and Impact of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
833, 840 (2005) (discussing President Clinton's "progressive" jurists).
19. See Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 236.
20. See id. at 238.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., President Clinton's District Judges: "Extreme Lib-
erals" or Just Plain Moderates?, 84 JUDICATURE 282, 286, 287 tbl.4 (2001) (showing that
President Clinton's nontraditional appointees may not be any more liberal than his more
traditional appointees).
2005]
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Preliminary studies on judicial opinion patterns of President
Clinton's nontraditional appointees show that they are no more
liberal than their white male counterparts.13 As one political sci-
entist observed based on a study of search and seizure decisions
by President Clinton's courts of appeals appointees, "Clinton's ju-
dicial appointments to the courts of appeals look more like
[George H.W.] Bush's appointees than like Carter's appointees,
and they clearly are not the 'judicial activists' that Republican
leaders claim."2 4 Overall, President Clinton appointees' voting re-
cords appear rather moderate at this point.2 As political scientist
Elliot Slotnick has observed:
The Clinton experience.., presents us with a bit of an ironic
twist.... [Sleveral articles in the symposium issue of Judicature on
judicial selection in the Clinton years (March-April 2001) clearly
documented that the president's nominees were all too often treated
as if they were ideological zealots, while their behavior on the bench
has demonstrated that they were quite moderate, actually the most
conservative appointees of any Democratic president sitting on the
bench today.
26
Political scientist Sheldon Goldman likewise notes, "President
Clinton shied away from those perceived by Republicans to be lib-
eral activists."27 Members of the Judiciary Committee and Repub-
lican members of the Senate appeared to be engaging in assump-
tions and stereotypes about these judicial nominees based on race
and gender.28 Unfortunately for these nominees, they were forced
to go through a more extended process in order to be considered
for the same position as white males.
23. See id. (revealing that in civil rights and liberties cases as well as labor and eco-
nomic regulation cases, President Clinton's traditional appointees were actually more lib-
eral than his nontraditional appointees); see also Susan B. Haire et al., The Voting Behav-
ior of Clinton's Courts of Appeals Appointees, 84 JUDICATURE 274, 299 (2001) (charac-
terizing President Clinton's appointees as moderates when compared to judges appointed
by other Democratic and Republican presidents); Nancy Scherer, Are Clinton's Judges
"Old" Democrats or "New" Democrats, 84 JUDICATURE 150, 154 (2000) (explaining that
President Clinton's courts of appeals appointees are not more liberal than President
George H.W. Bush's appointees in search and seizure cases); Jennifer A. Segal, Represen-
tative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District Court Appointees, 53 POL.
RES. Q. 137, 147-48 (2000) (recognizing President Clinton's nominees as noncontroversial
and politically moderate).
24. Scherer, supra note 23, at 154.
25. See Haire et al., supra note 23, at 278-79; Carp et al., supra note 22, at 288.
26. Slotnick, supra note 3, at 16.
27. Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the
Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 899 (2005).
28. See Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 238.
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One is also left wondering what affect the lengthened process
and apparent continued scrutiny even after a judge is appointed
might have on nontraditional appointees. Will they be more con-
servative in their decision-making because they fear charges of
bias? At the appellate level, will they feel constrained in present-
ing their panel colleagues with their differing perspectives? Is
this why President Clinton's nontraditional appointees tend to
vote less liberally in certain cases than their white male counter-
parts? Do the studies that show no difference in voting patterns
between male and female judges suggest that female judges try to
"fit in?"
As for what this says about judicial selection of nontraditional
federal judges, presidents-especially Democratic presidents
faced with Republican majorities in the Senate-are going to be
reluctant to nominate such judges because of the increased time
for confirmation. Indeed, this increased time might well make it
impossible in some cases for the sitting president to see that
nomination through by the end of his or her term in office.29 A
likely response by Democratic presidents (particularly Democ-
ratic presidents) may well be to appoint more conservative
women and members of minority groups with more traditional
career tracks in order to avoid some of these problems in the ap-
pointments process. Indeed, there is some evidence that President
Clinton did just that.3" This will likely lessen the potential for di-
versity to have an impact on the judicial system.
III. DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Much of the argument for a more diverse bench assumes that
diversity will make a difference. What sort of difference will
judges of diverse backgrounds make? Political scientists have
identified two theories on the effects of diversity among political
actors. The first, known as "symbolic representation," posits that
diversity provides certain groups with the opportunity to have ac-
cess to positions of influence so that all members of society will
believe in the fairness of the system.3' In the context of the judici-
29. See Lisa Holmes & Elisha Savchak, Judicial Appointment Politics in the 107th
Congress, 86 JUDICATURE 232, 233 (2003).
30. See Carp et al., supra note 22, at 286-87; Segal, supra note 23, at 147-48.
31. See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal
20051
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ary, the theory goes that a diverse bench is necessary for the
court system to have legitimacy, in essence to mirror the popula-
tion of those who will be coming before the courts. 32 Another rea-
son for diversification of the political branches is a functional or
substantive representation justification. 33 This justification sug-
gests that members of under-represented groups will advocate
the interests of the group to which they belong once elected or ap-
pointed to office.34 In the context of the judiciary, this would mean
that judges with differing backgrounds will bring differing per-
spectives to the bench that could lead, potentially, to differing re-
sults, or at least the advocating of different results, in lawsuits.35
However, another line of political theory suggests that it is the
political ideology of the judge that makes a difference in decision-
making. Called the "attitudinal model," this approach "posits that
the explanatory power of background characteristics derives from
their contribution to the formation of political attitudes and val-
ues, the most proximate influences on judicial decision making."36
Political scientists have long focused on the political affiliation of
the judge or his or her appointing president in an effort to predict
whether a judge will vote more conservatively or liberally in fed-
eral cases. 37 Thus, if a judge is a Republican or Democrat, or ap-
pointed by a Republican or Democratic president, his or her vot-
ing patterns will tend to be either more conservative or more
liberal.3 In terms of studying whether this attitudinal model ac-
Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 597 (1985).
32. R. William Ide III, Eradicating Bias in the Justice System, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at
8; Tony Mauro, Wider Courtroom Diversity Urged, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1999, at 3A. See
generally Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent "Yes," 61 J. POL. 628, 628 (1999) (describing four different contexts
in which a diverse bench is needed).
33. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 31, at 597.
34. See id.
35. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Pub-
lic Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 412-13 (2000); Michael E. Solimine & Susan
E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 896-97 (1995).
36. Segal, supra note 23, at 140 (citing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 86 (1992)).
37. See id.; Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:
A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYs. J. 219, 240 (1999); see also JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (discuss-
ing the attitudinal model in greater detail).
38. See Pinello, supra note 37, at 240. A meta-analysis of eighty-four studies of voting
record and political affiliation demonstrated a correlation between political party and vot-
ing habits ofjudges. Id. at 222-24.
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tually holds up in real cases, political scientists have studied out-
comes at the Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, and fed-
eral district court levels.39
Studies of voting records of nontraditional judges reveal mixed
results for the representational model when it comes to the voting
records of women and members of minority groups.4" Indeed,
studies of voting patterns of federal judges based on gender or
race of the judge do not reveal much of a gender or race effect,41
and some studies revealed a gender effect in the opposite direc-
tion-with, for example, men voting more liberally than women
judges.42 Some studies, however, do suggest that women and
members of minority groups will vote differently than their white
male counterparts in particular types of cases.43 The area I would
like to focus on today is one that is particularly important to
those of us who must work for a living-employment discrimina-
tion law.44
Political science professor Donald Songer and his colleagues
studied federal courts of appeals decisions published in the Fed-
eral Reporter between 1981 and 1990 in three case areas-search
39. See id. at 225-29 tbl.1 (listing studies included in the meta-analysis).
40. See, e.g., Walker & Barrow, supra note 31.
41. See, e.g., Sue Davis, President Carter's Selection Reforms and Judicial Policymak-
ing: A Voting Analysis of the United States Courts of Appeals, 14 AM. POL. Q. 328, 330-31
(1986) (finding little difference in the voting patterns of male and female federal courts of
appeals judges); John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Af-
firmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67
JUDICATURE 165, 172 (1983) (finding differences between President Carter's black and
white appointees in decisions affecting criminal defendants and prisoners' rights cases,
but not in race or sex discrimination cases); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1451-58 (1998) (finding differences based on race, but not based on gender); Walker &
Barrow, supra note 31, at 604-08 (finding no statistically significant differences based on
race between President Carter's white and African-American district court appointees).
But see Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make A Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126,
129, 134-35 (1988) (revealing differences in sentencing between black and white trial
judges in a large northeastern community).
42. See, e.g., Walker & Barrow, supra note 31, at 604-05 (finding women federal dis-
trict court judges appointed by President Carter less liberal than their male counterparts
on personal liberties and minority policy issues).
43. Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts:
Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994).
44. For studies of decision-making in employment discrimination cases, see id. at
434-37; Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making
on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago) (on file with author).
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and seizure, obscenity, and employment discrimination.45 While
there were no gender effects found in the search and seizure or
obscenity cases,46 "the coefficient for gender [was] positive, robust,
and statistically significant" for employment discrimination
cases." They also computed an estimated probability of a liberal
vote from a male judge or female judge.4" Setting the other inde-
pendent variables at their means resulted in a probability that a
male judge would cast a liberal vote (i.e., for the plaintiff) 38% of
the time, whereas a female judge would do so 75% of the time.49
As they concluded, "the impact of gender appears to be quite sub-
stantial."50
A recent study by political scientist Nancy Crowe likewise sup-
ports this. Crowe studied decisions in sex and race discrimination
cases in the federal courts of appeals from 1981 to 1996."' Her
study focused on nonconsensual cases, for example those cases in
which the panel (or the court sitting en banc) did not agree on the
outcome of the case.5 2 In other words, there was at least one dis-
senter, leaving out the entire body of cases in which the courts
reached a unanimous decision. Her findings were startling with
respect to the effects of race, gender, and political party (as well
as the combination of these factors) on voting in these cases. She
found that Democratic white female judges and Democratic Afri-
can-American male judges were most likely to cast a vote for a
sex discrimination plaintiff; they did so 90% and 93% of the time,
respectively. 53 Their white male counterparts voted for sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs 76% of the time. 54 The statistics on Republi-
can-appointed judges is likewise telling. White male Republican-
appointed judges voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs least of
45. See Songer et al., supra note 43, at 429.
46. See id. at 432-33. Instead, other variables were related to outcomes in these cases.
In obscenity cases, presidential appointment, region of the country, type of litigants, and
various case facts were important. Id. at 433 tbl.1. In search and seizure cases, existence
of a warrant finding of probable cause, or a finding by a trial court that one of the expecta-
tions to the warrant requirement were present correlated with outcomes. Id. at 434 tbl.2.
47. Id. at 434.
48. Id. at 434-35.
49. Id. at 435.
50. Id.
51. Crowe, supra note 44, at 45.
52. Id. at 56.
53. Id. at 83 fig.3.1
54. Id.
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all-only 28% of the time.55 Their white female and African-
American male counterparts voted for sex discrimination plain-
tiffs 53% and 61% of the time, respectively.56
In race discrimination cases, African-American male judges
appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents were
more likely to vote for a race discrimination plaintiff than their
white male and female counterparts. Republican-appointed Afri-
can-American male judges voted for race discrimination plaintiffs
60% of the time, and Democrat-appointed African-American male
judges voted for race discrimination plaintiffs 85% of the time.57
The difference between Democratic-appointed white male and
white female judges was not statistically significant: males voted
for the plaintiff 49% of the time, whereas females voted for the
plaintiff 51% of the time.58 Similarly, the difference between Re-
publican-appointed white male and white female judges was not
statistically significant; white males voted for the plaintiff 20% of
the time, whereas white females voted for the plaintiff 21% of the
time.59 Crowe's findings support the effect of race, gender, and po-
litical affiliation in sex discrimination cases, but do not support
differences based on gender in the context of race discrimination
cases at the court of appeals level. Instead, race and political af-
filiation correlate with differences in voting in race discrimination
cases.
60
Political scientist Jennifer Segal conducted a study attempting
to chart differences in voting behavior by President Clinton's tra-
ditional and nontraditional district court appointees.61 Pairing up
judges appointed during President Clinton's first term, she found
no differences in voting behavior between President Clinton's Af-
rican-American judges and white judges in a variety of case
types, including cases that should be of interest to African-
American judges, such as race discrimination, voting rights,
school desegregation, and affirmative action.62 Indeed, "the only
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 114 fig.4.1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Segal, supra note 23.
62. Id. at 144. But see Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontradi-
tional Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279, 279 (1997) (providing an earlier study of
20051
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statistically significant race difference [was found in] personal
liberties claims, for which black judges have less support than
their white colleagues."63 Instead, she found that "most rulings
made by both white and black judges were against the black posi-
tion, the criminal defendant, the personal liberty claim and the
other minority claims in these cases, and were in support of the
federal government's regulation of the economy." 4
The results based on gender paint a slightly different picture.
Segal found a gender difference in women's cases (gender dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, abortion rights, and related is-
sues), but it was not women who were more supportive of these
claims, but instead the men who were more supportive of
women's issues cases.65 Women are more supportive of claims in-
volving issues of concern to African-Americans as well as per-
sonal liberties claims.66 In other cases, any differences based on
gender did not reach statistical significance. Like the data based
on race, this data "demonstrates clearly that Clinton's judges, re-
gardless of gender, have ruled consistently against the out-group
positions in each of these sets of sensitive and controversial is-
sues."67 Thus, simply appointing a woman judge or an African-
American judge may not provide the sort of diversity that neces-
sarily leads to differences in outcomes.
IV. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE APPOINTMENT
OF DIVERSE JUDGES
President George W. Bush was the beneficiary of nearly 100
vacancies left by former President Clinton when President Bush
took office in 2001.6" While President Clinton had a difficult time
appointing judges to both the district courts and courts of ap-
President Clinton's appointees showing that both black and female judges were more sup-
portive of blacks' claims and black judges were more supportive of women's claims than
white male appointees).
63. Segal, supra note 23, at 144. A personal liberty claim involves rights protected
under the Bill of Rights. See id. at 143.
64. Id. at 144.
65. See id. at 144, 146 tbl.3.
66. Id. at 145. These two findings were statistically significant with probabilities of
.1 0 or less. Id. at 146 tbl.3; see also Walker & Barrow, supra note 31, at 604 (discussing
statistical significance).
67. Segal, supra note 23, at 145.
68. Holmes & Savchak, supra note 29, at 233.
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peals, in spite of filibusters that created difficulties for some ap-
pellate court nominees, President Bush has had an easier time
with district court appointees. 69 As of November 2003, President
Bush had seen 168 of his judicial appointees confirmed.7" In 2003
alone, President Bush saw sixty-eight of his nominees con-
firmed.7 This is more than President Reagan saw confirmed in
his first term in office and a better record than President Clinton
in seven out of the eight years he spent in the White House.72
Still, there was some delay for President Bush's nominees, al-
though Democratic senators have held up mostly courts of ap-
peals appointees.73
President Bush has been more successful appointing district
court judges than President Clinton.74 As political scientist Shel-
don Goldman has pointed out, while Democrats might have begun
the tactics of obstruction and delay in the judicial appointments
process, "Republicans escalated obstruction and delay so that it
reached all-time records for the district and appeals courts in-
cluding the then unprecedented index of 0.7931 for appeals court
nominees in the 106th Congress."75 Of course, the Democrats had
their turn using such tactics in considering court of appeals ap-
69. Id. at 239 ("A large majority of [President Bush's] nominations to the district court
were eventually confirmed, while many circuit court nominations garnered a good deal of
opposition from liberal interest groups and Senate Democrats.").
70. Savage, supra note 14, at A6.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The
Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 253 tbl.1 (2003). During the 105th
Congress (1997-1998) and 106th Congress (1999-2000), the last of the Clinton Admini-
stration, district court nominees took 164.7 days and 103.9 days, respectively from nomi-
nation to hearing. Id. It took 38.3 days and 25.6 days, respectively, for these nominees to
go from nomination to confirmation. Id. at 255 tbl.3. By contrast, the 107th Congress
(2001-2002), the first of the Bush Administration, took on average 96.3 days from receipt
of nomination to hearing. Id. at 253 tbl.1. It took these nominees 24.8 days from the day
the nomination was reported to confirmation. Id. at 255 tbl.3. While 84.7% of President
Bush's district court nominees during the 107th Congress were confirmed, only 68.7% of
President Clinton's appointees during the 106th Congress were confirmed. Id. at 253 tbl.1.
However, court of appeals appointees for both President Clinton and President Bush had
equally long waits during years of divided government from nomination to hearing. Id. at
254 tbl.2. President Bush's courts of appeals nominees fared better than President Clin-
ton's nominees in the time from nomination being reported to confirmation. In the 106th
Congress, it took President Clinton's appointees an average of 68.5 days, whereas during
the 107th Congress, it took President Bush's appointees an average of 26.4 days. Id. at 256
tbl.4.
75. Goldman, supra note 27, at 896.
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pointees during the 107th Congress, during which President
George W. Bush faced a divided government for much of the Con-
gress.76
The index of obstruction and delay ("Index") developed by
Goldman reveals that the 105th and 106th Congresses (during
the final years of the Clinton Administration) were the most ob-
structionist of district court appointees than any other Congress
from the 95th Congress (1977-1978) onward.77 The Index shows
that President Bush's district court nominees had a relatively
easy time: the Index was only 0.2432 for the 107th Congress
(President George W. Bush), whereas it was 0.5000 and 0.4722
for the 105th and 106th Congresses (President Clinton), respec-
tively.78
So what do we know about President George W. Bush's ap-
pointees? How diverse are they? My co-panelist, Sheldon Gold-
man, with his colleagues, have done a useful assessment of the
first two years of judicial appointments in the Bush Administra-
tion.79 The group President Bush has appointed has been very di-
verse, especially at the district court level, although not as di-
verse as President Clinton's appointees.8 0 In his first two years in
office, President Bush appointed six African-Americans (7.2% of
appointees), six Hispanics (7.2% of appointees), and seventeen
women (20.5% of nominees) to the district court bench." In his
first two years in office, President Bush appointed three women
and three African-Americans to the courts of appeals.8 2 All in all,
76. See, Goldman, supra note 74, at 252. The index of obstruction and delay for the
courts of appeals during the 107th Congress was 0.8387. Id. at 257 tbl.6.
77. See id. at 257 tbl.5. Professor Goldman developed the index of obstruction and de-
lay. According to Professor Goldman,
The Index.. . is determined by the number of nominees who remained uncon-
firmed at the end of the Congress added to the number for whom the confir-
mation process took in excess of 180 days, which is then divided by the total
number of nominees for that Congress. The Index is calculated to four places
to the right of the decimal point and this ranges from 0.0000, which indicates
an absence of obstruction and delay, to 1.0000, which indicates the maximum
level.
Id. at 255-56.
78. Id. at 257 tbl.5.
79. Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?,
86 JUDICATURE 282 (2003).
80. Id. at 294 tbl.1, 295.
81. Id. at 304 tbl.2.
82. Id. at 306 tbl.1.
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34% of his appointees in his first two years in office have been
nontraditional judges.8 3 Yet, in many ways, these nontraditional
appointees mirror their traditional colleagues in ways that are
significant.
V. OTHER ASPECTS OF DIVERSITY
While President Bush and President Clinton appointed a group
of diverse judges to the bench, there is more to diversity than
simply race and gender. These appointees are similar to tradi-
tional appointees in other ways that, perhaps, do not make them
as diverse as might be expected. In an article on President Bush's
appointees, Goldman gives a capsule sketch of some of these ap-
pointees.8 4 What struck me about them was the number who were
ex-prosecutors. Of the twenty-four biographical sketches provided
in the article, twelve were ex-prosecutors or ex-assistant United
States attorneys. 5 Indeed, 53.8% of the nontraditional district
court Bush appointees during the years studied came with prose-
cutorial experience. 6 Furthermore, 61.5% of them came with ju-
dicial experience. 7 In addition, they are similar to his traditional
appointees in that they are relatively wealthy. Over 50% of Presi-
dent Bush's nontraditional appointees during this period each
had a net worth of over $1 million. 8 Only one of them had a net
worth of less than $200,000.89
At the appellate level, 83.3% of President Bush's nontraditional
appointees came from the judiciary and all of them had been
judges at some point.9 ° While fewer came with prosecutorial ex-
perience, all had either judicial or prosecutorial experience. 91
However, a significant number of President Bush's traditional
(white male) appointees-40% of them-came with neither judi-
cial nor prosecutorial experience. 92 Once again, they were
83. Id. at 294 tbl.1.
84. Id. at 286-91.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 303 tbl.1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 306 tbl.3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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wealthy. Fifty percent of President Bush's nontraditional ap-
pointees were worth more than $1 million (three judges); one-
third were worth between $500,000 and $999,999 (two judges);
and one of them was worth under $200,000. 93 Most federal judges
are wealthy people. One can reasonably question whether many
of these judges could understand the day-to-day life of an em-
ployment discrimination plaintiff, for example, who works at
Wendy's.94
Interestingly, President Clinton's appointees are not all that
different. For example, 64% of President Clinton's nontraditional
appointees to the federal district courts during his last two years
in office had judicial experience compared with only 46.9% of his
traditional appointees. 95 In addition, 52% of them were ex-
prosecutors, whereas only 40.6% of his traditional appointees
were ex-prosecutors. 96 The similar career tracks might account for
the little difference in voting records between President Clinton's
traditional and nontraditional appointees.97
While one can understand the desire to appoint people with ju-
dicial experience, the prevalence of ex-prosecutors is interesting
and does not necessarily follow from the federal courts' caseload.
Although federal courts spend more time on criminal cases than
they have in the past, the majority of case filings are civil.9" Thus,
it makes sense to have judges who are familiar with both civil
and criminal cases sitting as federal judges. If former prosecutors
are useful as judges because more criminal cases are going to
trial, why not also tap former public defenders who likewise have
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Morgon v. Valenti Mid-Atlantic Mgmt., No. 01-134, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22420, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2001) (granting summary judgment for an em-
ployer in a racial harassment case involving an employee at a Wendy's restaurant).
95. See Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 243 tbl.2.
96. Id.
97. See infra text accompanying note 108.
98. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS. AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 45 (1996) (noting an increase of 70%
in criminal case filings from 1980 to 1992). Beale notes, however, that these levels are not
unprecedented. The federal courts' "criminal caseload has fluctuated widely since 1960,
and the number of federal criminal prosecutions was approximately the same in 1972 as it
[was in 1996]." Id. While criminal cases constituted 17% of the district court's case filings
in 1996, it amounted to one-third of the district court's filings in 1972. Id. at 46. However,
there is evidence that criminal cases are taking up more of the trial courts' time, even
though they are not the majority of cases filed. For example, more criminal cases are going
to trial, and criminal trials have become more lengthy. See id. at 47-48.
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expertise in criminal law? While some prosecutors ultimately en-
ter private practice and do defense work, it is not clear whether
this is the case for many of these sitting judges.
President Clinton appointees were likewise wealthy with 44%
of them worth more than $1 million, and only one nominee (4%)
worth less than $200,000."9 While the traditional appointees were
wealthier (62.5% were worth more than $1 million), three of the
traditional appointees were worth less than $200,000.100 His non-
traditional appointees to the courts of appeals likewise came
largely with judicial experience (85.7% of them) and over half
were ex-prosecutors (57.1%).101 While these numbers are some-
what skewed because of the few nominees who were confirmed
during this period (only thirteen),1 °2 they still paint a picture of a
nontraditional appointee career track that may not add as much
diversity as might at first be thought.
While many, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have argued
that the federal bench does not pay enough to attract qualified
judicial candidates (unless they are independently wealthy)," 3 I
suggest that presidents may not be looking in all the places they
could for judicial appointees. Prosecutors are common appointees
for both President Bush and President Clinton. 14 Where are the
public defenders? Legal aid lawyers? Public interest lawyers who
have done work for the NAACP or other organizations? Should
only rich people sit on the federal bench? Even though this bench
may appear diverse, it is not that diverse in terms of such back-
ground factors as socioeconomic status and career track.
Another issue from cognitive psychology gives further pause
about appointing judges who have practiced on only one side of an
issue, whether they be former prosecutors, former civil defense
lawyers from big firms, or others. Law Professor Deborah Rhode
has pointed out that lawyers who advocate a particular position
have an increased likelihood of adopting that position them-
99. Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 243 tbl.2.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 248 tbl.5.
102. See id.
103. See Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise: An
Examination of the Federal Judiciary Salary "Crisis," 87 MARQ. L. REV. 55, 55 (2003) (de-
scribing the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist on federal judicial salaries).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 86, 96.
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selves." 5 Cognitive conservatism, whereby people have a ten-
dency "to register and retain information that is compatible with
established beliefs or earlier decisions," and cognitive dissonance,
whereby "[aifter making a decision, individuals tend to suppress
or reconstrue information that casts doubt on that decision," both
may have an impact on judges who have been looking through the
lens of one side or another of an issue for too long.'0 6 As Professor
Rhode points out, "the very act of advocating a particular position
increases the likelihood that proponents will themselves come to
adopt that position .... The more closely that individuals identify
with their professional role, the less sensitive they may become to
problems in its normative foundations or practical conse-
quences."0 7 Thus, a judge who has been a prosecutor for a good
part of her career is likely to identify with the prosecution's posi-
tion more readily than with the defense's position. Indeed, in
Jennifer Segal's study of President Clinton's appointees to the
district courts, she found both traditional and nontraditional ap-
pointees had consistently ruled against outgroups, including
criminal defendants. 0 8 It takes a whole lot of self-awareness to
avoid this tendency.
Another aspect of the debate about appointments has been ju-
dicial ideology. While the Bush Administration has nominated
judges who were active in conservative legal groups, such as the
Federalist Society,0 9 President Clinton had a very difficult time
appointing judges affiliated with any groups that were thought
liberal."0 For example, he had difficulties appointing an ex-ACLU
board member and a poverty lawyer. Marsha Berzon was associ-
ate general counsel for the AFL-CIO for a number of years.1 She
was vice president of the Northern California ACLU for two years
and a member of its board of directors for eight years." 2 "[I]t took
well over two years for her to be confirmed for a position on the
105. Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 686
(1994).
106. Id. at 685-86.
107. Id. at 686. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illu-
sions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44 (2002) (describing study of judges
showing that they are subject to many of the same cognitive biases as other people).
108. See Segal, supra note 23, at 147-48.
109. Goldman et al., supra note 79, at 286, 289, 296.
110. Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 235-36.
111. Id. at 232.
112. Id.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."113 Nominated on
January 27, 1998, she was not confirmed until March 9, 2000."'
She, like some of President Bush's recent nominees,"' was sub-ject to repeated holds that delayed her appointment.
A similar story can be told by Richard Paez, a poverty lawyer
who worked for the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles before
he became a Los Angeles municipal judge. 116 First nominated on
January 25, 1996, he was not confirmed until March 9, 2000-
more than four years later."7 He was subjected to holds from
"conservative Republican senators who purported to see liberal
activism in a decidedly moderate judicial record."" 8
In contrast, the George W. Bush Administration has appointed
some highly ideologically conservative judges." 9 Yet, although
there was some delay for circuit nominees, his district court
nominees have not had as difficult a time as those of President
Clinton. 2 ° In addition, President Bush's judges were much fur-
ther ideologically conservative than President Clinton's judges
were ideologically liberal.' 2' For example, President Bush has ap-
pointed judges such as Paul Cassell to the federal district court in
Utah. 2 2 A Federalist Society member, Cassell has taken positions
against Miranda rights.'23 As a victim's advocate, he has argued
that no innocent person has been executed in this country for
roughly the last half century 24 and suggested that so few inno-
113. Id. at 233.
114. Id.
115. See Goldman, supra note 74, at 254 tbl.2 (indicating delay during the 107th Con-
gress, while President George W. Bush was in office, comparable to during the 105th Con-
gress, while President Clinton was in office).
116. Goldman et al., supra note 11, at 235.
117. Id. at 235-36.
118. Id. at 236.
119. Robert A. Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush's Judicial
Appointees, 88 JUDICATURE 20, 25-28 (2004).
120. See supra Part.III.
121. Carp et al., supra note 119, at 26-27.
122. Jonathan Groner, Bush May Hire Lobbyist For Nominations, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
18, 2002, at 1.
123. Eugene Volokh, Our Flaw? We're Just Not Liberals, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at
B3. Volokh argued as amicus before the Supreme Court of the United States that Miranda
warnings were not constitutionally mandated and that, therefore, a federal statute could
effectively overrule the case. Id. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. See Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432, 444 (2000).
124. Edward Cohn, Paul Cassell and the Goblet of Fire: A Conservative Professor's Ad-
venture in the Liberal Legal System, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 28, 2000, at 32.
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cent people were executed in the death penalty system-at least
as it was in 1988-that the possibility of an innocent person being
executed should not be a factor in the debate on the death pen-
alty. 125 Recent events in Illinois and elsewhere suggest that Judge
Cassell was incorrect. 126 While Judge Cassell may be a very good
judge, I am wondering why it is acceptable for the Bush Admini-
stration to appoint him but somehow not acceptable for the Clin-
ton Administration to appoint the more moderate judges that it
ultimately chose, or even the purportedly "liberal" Paez or Ber-
zon.
Events also have suggested that federal judges, even with life
tenure, who take provocative positions in cases are subject to con-
tinued political pressure that can make their jobs difficult.'27 Po-
litical scientist Jennifer Segal conducted an interesting study of
the Southern District of New York federal bench 121 in the wake of
the controversy surrounding the decision of district judge and
President Clinton appointee Harold Baer in United States v.
125. See Steven J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to
the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121 (1988) (arguing that the risk of exe-
cuting an innocent person "is too small to be a significant factor in the debate over the
death penalty"). Another one of President Bush's appointees, Lavenski Smith, appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has likewise worked for con-
servative groups, such as right to life organizations. See Unborn Child Amendment Comm.
v. Ward, 943 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Ark. 1997) (noting Lavenski Smith as the attorney of record
for the Unborn Child Amendment Committee, which was litigating in an attempt to halt
abortions at a state-run hospital).
126. See Michael L. Radelet, Introduction: Wrongful Convictions of the Innocent, 86
JUDICATURE 67 (2002) (noting that "[h]istory has proven [Markman and Cassell] to be
wrong"); see also Gerald Kogan, Errors of Justice and the Death Penalty, 86 JUDICATURE
111, 112 (2002) ("Having seen the dynamics of our criminal justice system over the years,
there is absolutely no question in my mind that we have executed people who either did
not fit the criteria for execution specified by the legislature of the State of Florida or who,
in fact, were factually not guilty of the crime for which they were executed."); Lawrence C.
Marshall, Do Exonerations Prove that "the System Works?," 86 JUDICATURE 83 (2002) (re-
viewing thirteen cases of inmates sentenced to death who were later exonerated, only
three of whom would have had convictions reversed on appeal); George Ryan, Closing Re-
marks by Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, Remarks at the Race to Execution Sym-
posium (Oct. 25, 2003), in 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1719 (2004) (recognizing that former Illinois
Governor George Ryan pardoned four people on the basis of innocence in January 2003);
Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges
to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1783 & n.41 (2004) (noting that
"[tihe risk of executing an innocent person was the most significant factor behind Gover-
nor Ryan's decision" to declare a moratorium on executions in Illinois).
127. Segal, supra note 23, at 148.
128. See Jennifer A. Segal, Judicial Decision Making and the Impact of Election Year
Rhetoric, 84 JUDICATURE 26, 27, 31-33 (2000).
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Bayless.129 In Bayless, Judge Baer ruled that drugs seized from
the back of a car Bayless was driving and a confession police ob-
tained later were inadmissible because the police had no reason-
able suspicion that warranted pulling Bayless over in the first
place. 3° One of the facts that the police relied upon was that four
men, who had placed some bags in the trunk of the car Bayless
was driving, purportedly fled once they saw the police watching
them.'31 In his decision, Baer stated that
residents in this neighborhood [have] tended to regard police officers
as corrupt, abusive and violent. After the attendant publicity sur-
rounding [an earlier investigation of an anti-crime unit in the par-
ticular neighborhood], had the men not run when the cops began to
stare at them, it would have been unusual. 132
Baer was heatedly criticized after the decision. 133 Newt Gin-
grich stated that "'[tihis is the kind of pro-drug-dealer, pro-crime,
anti-police and anti-law enforcement attitude that makes it so
hard for us to win the war on drugs.""' 4 Judge Baer eventually
reversed his decision."' Reviewing decisions by both President
Clinton's appointees as well as Republican appointees reveal that
critiques of President Clinton's appointees such as Harold Baer,
who was said to be pro-defense or, more derisively, pro-crime and
pro-drug dealer, in criminal cases, were without empirical sup-
port.136 Instead, "very few pro-defendant decisions were made by
any of these judges sitting in this district" from January 1994 to
July 1997.137 "[T]hese judges as a group were overwhelmingly pro-
prosecution.""' They might well be overwhelmingly pro-
prosecution because so many of them are ex-prosecutors. 139 A
more diverse bench might add differences in perspective that
could enrich the debate about such issues as the Fourth Amend-
ment.
129. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
130. Id. at 242-43.
131. Id. at 236.
132. Id. at 242.
133. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Segal, Judicial Decision Making and the Impact of Election
Year Rhetoric, 84 JUDICATURE 26, 29-30 (2000).
134. Id. at 30 (quoting Ian Fisher, Gingrich Asks Judge's Ouster for Ruling Out Drug
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at B4).
135. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
136. Segal, supra note 133, at 27.
137. Id. at 32.
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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VI. CONCLUSION
One is left wondering whether it would be possible to appoint a
Thurgood Marshall to the bench modernly. I am concerned about
what this means for the development of the law. Will we have
great dissents, thoughtful decision-making, and judges who are
forced to view cases from the perspectives of others who are not
like them? Or, will it be such a homogeneous bench in terms of
background that we will miss the sometimes great decision-
making that comes from debate between judges of differing view-
points?
